(NBC Sports/@MarcusD)
It is the play call that has been labeled by fans and observers alike as one of the worst plays ever called in the Super Bowl. The question has been raised repeatedly almost as soon as the confetti started pouring down from the rafters of the University of Phoenix Stadium on Sunday night: What was Seattle head coach Pete Carroll thinking?
As the teams lined up for the play, Jermaine Kearse (15) and Ricardo Lockette (83) were in a stack formation split to the right. New England cornerbacks Brandon Browner (39) and Malcolm Butler (21) had the defensive assignment on both of those receivers, with Browner lined up closer to the line of scrimmage to bump and/or engage Kearse to slow him down.
At the snap, Browner immediately engaged Kearse, who was unable to break off. The effect of Browner tying up Kearse was twofold: Kearse was unable to potentially make a cut to the back corner of the end zone for a fade pass, and more importantly in hindsight, was unable to break free to set a pick on Butler as Lockette ran the slant pattern into the middle.
Again, with the benefit of hindsight, the play seemed to target Lockette all the way, but Butler had a clear passage. Not only was he able to break up the play, but was able to lead in with his shoulder to bump Lockette and jump the route for the interception.
That Carroll and offensive coordinator Darrell Bevell dialed up a pass play from the 2-yard line with one of the best running backs in the league in his backfield remains part of the issue. An incomplete pass that close to the end zone would not have taken much time off the 25 remaining seconds left.
The argument has been made that New England was anticipating the run, and a pass would have caught their defense off guard. If that were true, then the simple counter would be to point out that if Seattle was looking to stretch the defense, there was very little logic in calling a slant play right into the middle of where all the traffic was after the snap.
If a play was (for example) designed for Marshawn Lynch to get open out of the backfield to the left or for Kearse to break to the back right corner, the defensive backs would have had very little time to react, and even if nobody had gotten open, Russell Wilson could have easily thrown the ball away.
On top of that, Wilson could also have used his legs to make a run for the end zone, which would have taken even more time off the clock than running what Carroll claimed was a throwaway play by design. As Lynch breaks to the left, New England linebacker Akeem Ayers is a step behind in coverage, and would have been stuck in no-man’s land deciding whether to maintain coverage on Lynch or try to stop Wilson on a run to the end zone.
Statistically, the case for the pass was actually very solid. This season, teams called pass plays on the opposition’s 1-yard line 108 times, and 66 of those plays resulted in touchdowns for a 61.1% rate of success, while runs netted a mere 57.8% touchdown rate (129 of 223 attempts).
On the other hand, this was a matchup of the #2 power-running team in the league this season against the defense that ranked 27th out of 32 in stuffing runs for no gain or a loss.
In hindsight, it is New England head coach Bill Belichick that would’ve been second-guessed for not using the timeouts that he had left to stop the clock and save time for Tom Brady to take New England downfield for a game-tying field goal if Seattle had been able to score. Carroll would also have been lauded for having the guts to call a pass play when everyone was assuming that Lynch was going to get the ball. Such is the fine line between genius and madness in sports.
What fate has left us with instead is the only thing that Super Bowl XLIX’s viewers know with certainty about this game-deciding play – the reasoning behind it will go down in NFL history as one of the most contentious coaching decisions of all time.
(Feature image: AP Photo/Kathy Willens)
